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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

UTAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIA-1\
TION, a Utah Cmporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.WLBURN DALE HiELM and
MARIE L. HELM, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

No. 10509

)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF
THE CASE
This is an action for a Declaratory Judgment declaring and determining the meaning of a lease between the
plaintiff as lessee and the defendants as lessors, or in the
alternative, a reformation of said lease.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Summary Judgment was granted upon the original
complaint which sought an interpretation of the contract.
Plaintiff then attempted to add a cause of action ,in refor-
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mation by way of amending his complaint. The plaintiff's
Motions to set aside the Summary Judgment, foT permission to file an amended complaint, and for an Order requiring the plaintiff to make deposits in court pendente lite
were denied. From the Summary Judgment and denial of
the plaintiff's Motions, the plaintiff appeals.

REI.JEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent seeks an affirmanoe of the lower
court's Summary Judgment, with denial of leave to amend;
and respondent seeks a dismissal of the action with preju-

dice.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with and adopts the statement of
facts recited by appellant.
POINf NO. I
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND FOR REFUSING TO SET ASIDE SAID SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FDR THE REASON THAT AS A MATTER

OF LAW THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF ~UGHT.
This is clearly an attempt to escape the consequences
of a lease agreement by manufacturing a cause for breach.
The plaintiff, Utah CoopeTative Association, made a bargain which turned out to be unsatisfactory to them. The
lease agreement was drafted by the appellant, Utah Cooperative Association. The lease agreement is nine ( 9) legal
sized pages of technical language. It attempts to protect
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the appellant from most imaginable disagreeaible si.tuatiOlnS
which might be encountered and for which the appellant
might desire relief. It is clear that the contract is an integrated document and is intended to be the total embodiment of all agreements between the parties. Appellant
now asserts that paragraph 7 of the lease entitled the plaintiff to the termination of its obligati()lllS, and they rely on
the sentence in this paragraph which states "It is understood and agreed that if by reason of any law, ordinance,
or regulation of properly constituted authority, or by injunction, Lessee is prevented from using all or any sUJbstantial or material part of the property herein leased as
a service station for the sale and storage of gasoline and
petroleum products, or if the use of the premises as a service station shall be in any subsbw.tiaJ or material manner
restrict.ed, or should any governmental authority refuse at
any time during the term or extension of this lease to grant
such permits as may be necessary for the installation of
reasonable equipment and operation of said premises as a
service station, then the Lessee may, at its option, surrender and cancel its lease, remove its improvements and
equipment from said property, and be relieved from the
payment of rent or any other obligation as of the date of
said surrender." (Emphasis added.)
It is the respondent's position in this brief that
this language is clear upon its face and that this clearly
entitles the respondent to Summary Judgment. It necessarily also follows that if the language is clear, then there
could be no material facts which could vary the terms of
the agreement. The Parol Evidence rule would bar any
conflicting affidavits or testimony. This is a matter so
(1)

LI.

fundamental that extensive discussion is unnecessary. See
Selection&ion Williston on- Contracts (Revised Edition) Sec.
639,· p. 509.
That general rule is further supported by the facts of
this case. · The appellant drafted this contract which it now
claims is "manifestly unconcionable". It was executed on
May 5, 1961, and for three years, until 1965, the Appellant
claimed the benefits and privileges of the lease without
complaint and without claim that it had erred in its provisions.. It· does not complain today that a provision was
actually ·left out in the dTafting or reduction to writing of
the agreement. It is merely complaining that it does not
like the court's interpretation of the lease and that this is
a "mistake" wlhich entitles it to reformation.
To support its position, the appellant has emphasized
the phrase starting with "or if the use of the premises as
a service station shall be ·in any substantial or material
manner restricted" as a basis for rescission, but the appellant neglects the frst part of the sentence which starts "It
is understood and agreed that if by reason of any law, ordinance or regulation of properly constituted authO'rity, or
by injunction . . . " The ordinary rules of English usage
require that the first of the sentence elaiborates and explains, and limits the use of the term "restricted" as used
in the appellant's argument. Thus, the import of the sentence is that a governmental regulation must be the limiting· restriction. Even without reading this parenthetioal
phrase which certainly clarifies the intent of the sentence,
the· use of the word "restriction" itself couldn't be conceivably stretched· in the English language to include the claim
of the plaintiff. Restriction denotes "to confine, to keep
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within limits", Webster's New World Dictionary of the
American Language, College Edition, 1954, and connotes
an interference. It would require an extreme twisting of
the mother tongue to hold that the construction of a high\Vay restricts, and therefore interferes with, the use of
property two miles away bounded on another highway,
especially when the construction of the new highway was
contemplated by the parties in determining the price of
the lease. The use of the word in this manner would destroy the value orf the English language as a means of solidifying expectations by the use of contracts.
To interpret the phrase "in any manner restricted" as
the appellant does, would open a Pandora's box, since the
reasons for business failure are as many and varied as the
nwnerous businesses which fail every year. Poor management, disagreeable customer relations, excessive cut
throat competition, inefficiency, lack of modern equipment,
and just plain disinterest in the business can cause its failuse; but by such a humble phrase as that in question the
plaintiff would have the Lessor be an insurer of the appellant's business success and protect the appellant against
its own inabilities.
The appellant further asserts that at the least the
contract is ambiguous. It claims that any contract is
vague, ambiguous or uncertain if the paragraph "does not
say the service station lease may not be terminated. if the
highway construction greatly altered the flow of traffic
away from the leased premises".
It is repectfully submitted that this position is ridicu-

lous and untenable. To apply such a rule under the law
of contracts would be to make every contract ambiguous,
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uncertain or vague, and would flood the courts with litigation A written memorandum would have no sanctity
or binding power. Every contractual promise could be sidestepped or parried by the legal threats that the contract
didn't specifically provide for the particular unexp2cted or
unmentioned contingency. It is respectfully submitted that
no contract could ·be drafted which could provide for every
contingency in a specific manner such as called for by the
appellant.
The appellant's approach was recognized and rejected
in the case of Deseret National Bank vs. Dinwoodey, 17
Utah 43, 53 Pac. 215 (1898). The is.sue in tht case was
whether a guaranty contract was to cover past obligations
as well as future, and the court required that this be stated
in the contact and reJected the notion of ambiguity in the
following language, at page 61:

"Can any person say that there is a word in said
instrwnent that makes the slightest reference, direc1ly
or indirectly, to any past transaction? To do so, it
seems to us, would be to entirely disregard ali rults of
interpretation. We must therefore hold that, under
the written instrument, the appellant was liable only
for loans and advances made to the Burton-Gardner
Company after the execution of the instrument, and
not for pre-existing debts, in accordance with the
terms of the contract."
It ·is respectfully submitted that paragraph 7 of the
lease is clear on its face and in no way can be construed
to permit the relief that the plaintiff seeks.
The appellant further asserts that the rule of Bullough
vs~- Sims; 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P2d 20, 1965, is applicable
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to tlhe facts of this case. Respondent agrees fully with the
rule of law there enunciated, but must respectfully point
out to appellant that here there was no common understanding or a mutual course ()If action between the parties
to vary the terms of the written agreement, and at no time
has respondent done other than to abide by the very clear
terms of the written agreement; and the respondent b8s
L11Sisted that appellant do the same.
Likewise, the respondent has no argument witll the
holding in Bartell vs. Associated Dental Supply Company,
114 C.A.2d 750, 251P2d16, (1952), where there was very
obviously a drafting error in the lease. The appellant asserts that the facts of this case make it "sufficiently important not to resort to a guess as to what the lease means."
It is respectfully submitted that ·in this case the hazards
and uncertainty of a guess can he avoided by reading ·the
iease agreement.

POINT NO. II
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED
COMPLAINT.
The respondent agrees that the right to make amendments in the ends of justice should be wholeheartedly and
vigorously defended. Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure authorizes and provides for such an amendment.
Respondent must also agree that the appellant has the right
to file independent or alternate claims in setting forth· a
c:ause orf action. It is the respondent's position, h01Wever,
that the Judge did not abuse his discretion in denying appellant leave to file an amended complaint because the ap-
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pellant could not state a valid cause of action and could
not validly reform the contract, and that, therefoTe, the
interest of justice required a sp2ffly termination of these
harrassment proceedings against the respondents, Wilburn
Dale Hlelm, and Marie Helm.
The appellant has asserted that by being permitted the
right to seek an action for reformation that he coold state
a valid claim. However, by this assertion, the appellant has
put himself in a very tenuous position which has striking
legal implications. In the first complaint filed by the appellant, the appellant relied on the contract, asserting its validity and demanding that as a matter of law under the
contract, the appellant was entitled to the relief sought.
To buttress this claim for purposes of a summary judgment,
the appellant filed the affidavit of Mr. Ervil Hansen, a representative of the appellant Utah Cooperative Association,
who said "that said terms were intended by the parties to
provide Plaintiff, Utah Cooperative Association, with the
right to terminate the lease upon the occurrence of facts referred to in paragraph 5 of said complaint." Thus, the
appellant chose to rely on the contract and to rely on the
interpretation of the contract. This is a matter of law
for the court.
It is readily conceded by the respondent that "reliance"
by the appellant was doubtful at best and probably spurious. But by filing their complaint and signing their affidavit, the representatives of the appellant chose to rely
on the legal interpretation orf the contract. After the Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondent in
this action, the Appellant suddenly discovered that it no
longer wished to rely upon the contract and norw it asserts
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that it may legally and validly base a claim for rescission.
on its "mistake." It is respectfully submitted that although
the appellant made what are alleged to l:>e alternative
claims, it cannot correct an admitted position, taken by
affidavit, by later pleading a totally inconsistent cause.
'Dhus, it is submitted that the lower court did not abuse
its discretion for the reason that the appellant could not
state a valid cause of action in an action for reformation.
There could be no fraud here where the appellant, after
making the negotiations, drafted the contract. There is
no assertion of a mistake of fact, no claim is made that a
secretary left out a clause, a phrase~ or paragraph of the
contract. All that is asserted is that the appellant does
not like the court's inteTpretation 'Of the contract and that
this was a "mistake."
This is, at best, a mistake of law. It is respectfully
submitted that such is not a basis upon which to grant a
reformation of a contract where one of the parties did not
like the court's interpretation of the contract. This would
open up anotJher Pandora's box, and is the very basic heart
of the rationale behind the Parol Evidence rule and the ordinary laws of contract intevpretation. To destroy this
stronghold of certainty woold annihilate the business world,
for no one could foresee and draft provisions for all oontingencies. It would be a sad day when the contract would
be for all practical purposes negotiated and drafted by litigation. It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant's
position logically must lead to this conclusion.
The law applica:ble to this .situation has been amply
discussed. in the ease of Deseret National Ba.Dk v. Din-...

10
woodey, cited above, and in the case of Andrus v. Blazzard,
23 Utah 233, 63 Pac. 888.
In the former case the plaintiff asserted that " [t] his

reformation is asked for on the ground of mutual mistake
on the part of the plaintiff and defendants, (p. 46) ... "
The Supreme Court rejected the mutuality, but held
on page 60:
"If there was any mistake in the execution, it was
a mistake of law on the part of the bank, but such a
mistake the law cannot relieve against. A mistake of
law is an erroneous conclusion as to the legal effect
of known facts, and it is laid down as a general rule,
by a very large list of auhorities, that such a mistake,
unconnected with a mistake of fact, and where there
are no indications of fraud, imposition, Oi' undue advantage entering into the agreement, it will not be
corrected by a court of equity. 2 Porn. Eq. Jur. Secs.
842-847; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 635; Hunt v. Rousamanier, 1Pei.1; Trigg v. Read, 43 Am. Dec. 447; Goodenow v. Ewer, 16 Cal. 461; Stoors v. Barker, 10 Am.
Dec. 316; Bank of U. S. v. Daniel, 12 Pei. 32; Loftus
v. F°JSher, (Cal.) 39 Pac. 1065.

We are clearly of the opinion, therefore, that respondent is not entitled to have said written instrument reformed, either upon the theory of mutual mistake in its execution, or mistake of law, there being
no fraud or deception charged in the pleadings, or attempted to be proven upon the trial, but that the parties must stand upon the instrument as it appears upon
its face and the rights accruing therefrom."
This principle denying relief for a mistake of law was
reaffirmed in the Andrus case. There the issue involved
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the legal effect on a guardian of signing a note on behalf of
his incompetent. The court said at page 254:
"The guardian and beneficiaries of said note were
fully aware of all the facts regarding the transaction;
there was no mistake respecting the language of the
note, but it was in the form and was executed in the
manner intended. It is noit claimed that there was any
fraud or mistake of fact in the transaction. The substance of resiponden's claim is that he and the beneficiaries did not intend the note in legal effect should
bind the guardian personally.
When the facts are within the knowledge of both
parties to a written contract, and the language. used is
such as they intended, a mistake as to the legal effect
of the contract or that its legal effect is different from
that intended, is not available as a defense at law, and
is not ground for a reformation of the contract in a
court of equity, and can not be shown by parol."
The oourt thereafte'r cited many authorities elaborating the reasons for the rule.
1

For the present case before this Court, it is submitted
that this rule is directly in point and is compelling. The
trial court had before it, not only the motion to amend, but
also the facts and affidavits of the amended complaint. It
would appear without unnecessary elaboration that the appellant could not state a cause of action after it had made
its claim in the first complaint.
The trial court was not oblivious to this and also recognized the added hardship which the appellant seeks to
impose by extending the litigation and withholding the payments from the respor.dent in order to wage the war on the
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principle of economic submission. The court acted wisely
and justly in its summary decision.
POINT NO. III
THERE IS NO NEED TO PAY THE DISPUTED
LEASE MONEY INTO COURT PENDING DISPOSITION
OF THIS MATTER.
'rhe appellant bases its claim for the right to pay the
lease money into court upon the theory that it legally would
not be entitled to recover the money if it failed in its action.
It is submitted that this has no application to the facts
presented here where the money is very obviously being
paid under protest, and the Court could just as easily require repayment after decision without prejudice to the
parties.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing principles, your petitioner
requests that the Court find that appellant has no valid
claim for relief and that his appeal be dismissed with prejudice.

